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SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION: 
A SCHELLING POINT 
MARTIN EDWARDS† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a reality television game show where two contes-
tants begin the game in two different places in New York City.1  
The object of the game is for the two contestants to find each 
other, but they do not know anything about each other and they 
have no way of communicating.  If they succeed, both contestants 
win a prize.  If they fail, they get nothing.  With no ability to ex-
plicitly bargain over the meeting, the parties have to make an 
educated guess about what the other person is most likely to do.  
Most people, confronted with this sort of tacit coordination game,2 
will attempt the meeting at a major New York City landmark 
such as the Empire State Building.3  Absent any other clues as to 
the optimal equilibrium meeting point, both parties choose a 
place that is imaginatively unique and intuitive, expecting that 
the place will also be unique in the other’s imagination.4  The 
Empire State Building stands out not because it is a particularly 
optimal meeting place, but rather because it is iconic, nearly syn-
 
† Assistant Professor of Law, Belmont University College of Law. J.D., Duke 
University, B. Acc’y, The University of Mississippi. The author would like to thank 
participants in the University of Chicago Legal Scholarship Workshop, the 
Mississippi College School of Law Faculty Forum, and other kind readers for helpful 
comments. A special thanks to the editors at the St. John’s Law Review for their 
insightful comments and efforts in editing this paper. Any remaining errors are 
mine. This Article was funded through the Mississippi College School of Law 
Scholarship Grant program. All my work is dedicated to Annie and Bella.  
1 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 56 (rev. ed. 1980). 
2 See infra Section III.A. This coordination game was actually played on 
television, and all but one pair of teams found one another. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & 
BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A GAME THEORIST’S GUIDE TO SUCCESS 
IN BUSINESS AND LIFE 110–11 (2008). 
3 DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 2. Many of Schelling’s students chose Grand 
Central Terminal at noon. SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 55 n.1. Schelling supposed 
this was because he was teaching at Yale at the time, and therefore residents of New 
Haven would think of Grand Central Terminal as the first place they would go if 
they traveled from New Haven to New York. See id. 
4 SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 54. 
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onymous with New York City itself.  This is called a “focal point,” 
or “Schelling point,” after Professor Thomas Schelling. 
There are two important observations that arise from the New 
York City game: first, that people can coordinate without com-
munication and, second, that value-creating outcomes5 can be 
achieved despite multiple equilibria6 and high transaction costs.7  
As to the former, the fact that many more people than would be 
expected by chance would likely collect the prize illustrates that 
coordination without communication is possible.8   
The latter is more interesting because most real-life coordi-
nation occurs with some communication.  Thus, logic might sug-
gest that if communication were permitted, the parties would 
simply bargain to an optimal solution.9  It could be that one con-
testant started at Columbia University and the other at Arthur 
Ashe Stadium, the optimal meeting point was actually equidis-
tant between the two, and the optimal meeting time was around 
5:18 a.m., when traffic on the streets was at the lowest.10  But, 
even in explicit bargaining contexts, the bargainers still, far more 
often than logic would dictate, fall back on logically irrelevant 
but imaginatively simple solutions.11   
Part of the reason for this is that real-life coordination, per-
haps unlike the New York game, involves some degree of embed-
 
5 “Value-creating” is the term used here because, importantly, focal points do 
not always lead to optimal outcomes. Law-and-economics, like economics, has long 
concerned itself with finding the optimal. Some definitions are formal statements of 
economic efficiency (e.g., Pareto efficient, Kaldor-Hicks efficient), while others are 
intuitive (e.g., appropriate level of corporate manager attention to voluntary efforts 
at protecting the environment). Similarly, some argue that optimality is derived 
from measures of utility or wealth, or that free exchange defines and begets utility 
and wealth. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 6–7 (1996).  
6 In the New York game, any meeting place could be a “winning” equilibrium. 
7 See N. Gregory Mankiw, New Keynesian Economics, in THE CONCISE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 379, 381 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008). Here, 
transaction costs are the cost of negotiating a meeting place if communication were 
available. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20–21, 23 
(1982).  
8 E.g., SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 114 (describing the situation where two 
spouses lose track of each other in a store and must coordinate to find each other 
and go home). 
9 See, e.g., id. at 50. 
10 See Ben Wellington, Quantifying the Best and Worst Times of Day To Hit the 
Road in NYC, I QUANT NY (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:34 AM), https://iquantny.tumblr.com/ 
post/93845043909/quantifying-the-best-and-worst-times-of-day-to-hit [https://perma 
.cc/6Q5D-AN4K] (finding that the lowest-traffic time of day in New York City is 5:18 
a.m., which is when taxis were able to maintain the highest average speed). 
11 SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67. 
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ded conflict.12  Both sides want to get the best deal possible for 
themselves which, while the transaction as a whole will make 
both sides better off if a deal is reached, does not mean there is 
not a conflict over who gets the greater share of the surplus cre-
ated by the transaction.  That conflict, in turn, makes the com-
mitments proposed in the explicit bargain less than credible, as 
they might be made out of strategic motive to capture more of the 
surplus rather than one of facilitating the exchange.  In a sense, 
this diminishment in credibility devolves the explicit bargaining 
back into tacit bargaining, because communication that lacks 
credibility is likely to lead to the same place as not communi-
cating at all: settling for a Schelling point or not making a deal.13 
The other reason is that discovering and implementing these 
optimizations is costly.  Once the bargain reaches the stage where 
continuing to optimize gets too costly—either strategically or 
otherwise—the parties can, and often do, choose the logically 
irrelevant and perhaps suboptimal, yet contextually intuitive, 
solution to break the strategic deadlock or forgo the additional 
costs.14   
Finally, a word on what makes a point contextually intuitive.  
One way is physical or geographic uniqueness—the Empire State 
Building is very tall and associated in the popular mind with 
New York City.  Another way is that once bargainers agree on a 
Schelling point as the way to conclude their bargain, they will 
return to it in future bargains—again, to avoid costs.15 
These, then, are the primary features of Schelling points: 
they permit coordination in high-transaction-cost, multiple-equi-
librium environments because they are contextually intuitive.  
They are value-creating, though not always optimal—that is, 
another equilibrium might be more optimal by a given measure, 
but the one that is contextually intuitive makes coordination 
easier and more likely.  They may be contextually intuitive due 
to some characteristic—for example, the Empire State Building’s 
association with New York City—or due to having been produc-
tively used to coordinate people in prior dealings, or, often, both.16  
 
12 See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1033 (2006). Of course, one party could always push the other to come to her location 
or a location more convenient for her. 
13 See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67; see also David Friedman, A Positive 
Account of Property Rights, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 13 (1994). 
14 See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67.  
15 Friedman, supra note 13. 
16 See infra Sections IV.B.1–2.  
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A Schelling point is an intuitive, if imperfect, place for bargainers 
to conclude a bargain where a suboptimal bargain is superior to 
no bargain at all.  
Shareholder wealth maximization is the norm within corpo-
rate law and governance holding that directors’ and officers’ roles 
are, fundamentally, to maximize the long-term value of the cor-
poration, and thus the value of its shares of stock.17  The debate 
over whether it is or should be the norm or the law for corpo-
rations is usually contested on different theories of economic or 
social value, and, of course, legal precedent.18  The extant law-
and-economics theories of corporate law view shareholder wealth 
maximization as an efficient term in a hypothetical bargain 
between corporate managers and directors on one side and 
shareholders on the other side.19  The argument goes that it has, 
by reason of this efficiency, emerged as the law.20  Competing 
theories rest on a rejection of this “contractarian” theory of the 
firm due to empirical results that run counter to the theory, 
persistent counterfactuals that undermine the norm’s existence, 
and scant hard precedent for the norm.21  At times in the wide-
ranging academic and public debate, commentators have called 
for dividing managerial focus among wealth maximization and 
other matters such as worker wealth, environmental sustainabil-
ity, and other nonfinancial social concerns.22   
 
17 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 245 (3d ed. 2015); PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. L. INST. 
2008). But see Eric Franklin Amarante, What We Talk About When We Talk About 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 19 TRANSACTIONS 455, 459–62 (2017) (illustrat-
ing the complexity buried just within the words “shareholder,” “wealth,” and 
“maximization”). One of the myriad debates that involves shareholder wealth 
maximization is about what it actually means. See id. at 459. 
18 Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192, 1199–1202 (2002). 
19 Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. 
Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 185 (2008). 
20 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 120–21.  
21 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Max-
imization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1428 
(1993). See infra Section II.A; Stout, supra note 18, at 1192–93, 1208 (stating that 
ownership and residual claimant theories are “empirically incorrect” and “false”); 
Ann M. Lipton, What We Talk About When We Talk About Shareholder Primacy, 69 
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 863, 868–69 (2019) (proposing the different hypothetical 
desires of shareholders that may be in conflict with increasing the value of the 
residual claim). 
22 Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of 
Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1993). 
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This Article, purposely, does not stake a position on whether 
shareholder wealth maximization is socially optimal, or whether 
expanding corporate governance to include greater focus on other 
matters would be better.  Instead, it reflects on the role the norm 
plays in coordinating people and money.  It strives to illustrate 
that shareholder wealth maximization “works” because it is a 
contextually intuitive way to coordinate within the high-cost, 
multiple-equilibrium bargaining environment associated with 
large public corporations. 
Capital is necessary to run a corporation and generally, cor-
porations cannot obtain enough capital from debt-financing 
sources.  For that reason, they must sell stock or equity.  That 
arrangement, like all the other contracts that make up the 
corporation, must consist of some kind of bargain.  This Article 
proposes that selling stock or equity is an arrangement of the 
kind Professor Schelling describes—a coordination game with 
embedded conflict.23  Given the practical impediments to actual 
bargaining, the value of coordinating investment and resolving of 
conflicts between the shareholders and the managers and 
directors by settling on shareholder wealth maximization is 
reflected in the fact that this bargain is so often struck.  One way 
to describe this process is as Professor Schelling did—that there 
was something contextually intuitive about the idea of 
maximizing shareholder wealth. 
Everyone who might want to invest in any corporation or run 
one understands, in general, what it means for a corporation to 
orient itself toward maximizing shareholder wealth.24  The key 
observation is that the shareholders recognize, generally, that 
managers and directors are going to be trying to maximize 
wealth.  This recognition is independent of any individual share-
holder’s actual desires or purposes, regardless of whether those 
desires or purposes are advanced or frustrated by the norm—that 
is, even if shareholders wanted managers and directors to do 
something else, they generally know that managers and directors 
 
23 See also Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 540, 582 (1995) (describing the bargaining between individual 
shareholders and the managers as a tacit bargain of the kind Schelling analyzed). 
24 This is not to say that every person’s actual decisions in any given transaction 
or case will be in alignment. It just means that the concept of focusing on max-
imizing corporate wealth is relatively simple. Cf. Lipton, supra note 21, at 891–92. 
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will be trying to maximize wealth.25  This sheds some light on 
why it might have emerged as the norm for animating director 
and officer conduct in the beginning, why it has been enshrined 
in the law in Delaware and elsewhere, and why it continues as a 
norm today.  In sum, I hope this Article answers the question: 
Why is shareholder wealth maximization so persistent, even 
granting its inefficiencies, shortcomings, and even granting its 
occasional failure to result in anyone’s wealth being maximized?  
The posited answer is that shareholder wealth maximization’s 
contextual intuitiveness has resulted in its becoming a load-
bearing part of corporate governance.  It is persistent for its 
usefulness, if not always preferred for its optimality.  In the 
hypothetical bargain between the managers and directors on one 
side, and the shareholders on the other, shareholder wealth 
maximization represents a value-creating, if not always optimal, 
equilibrium. 
It is important to add that the public is taking a more keen 
interest in the role of corporations in society.26  Many view 
shareholder wealth maximization as socially harmful, or, at 
minimum, a powerful impediment to social progress or change.27  
While describing shareholder wealth maximization as a Schelling 
point is not the sort of idea that would necessarily respond to 
calls for reform premised upon the need for social change, 
understanding its persistence should be a part of the debates to 
come.  There is no doubt that the economics, social value, and 
legal doctrine will be up for debate over the next few years, but 
the debate will be incomplete without a full account of the norm’s 
coordinating function.  This Article, hopefully, contributes part of 
such an account. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Following this Intro-
duction, Part II provides a brief overview of the extant theories of 
the firm, the way these theories interact with existing doctrines, 
 
25 Cf. SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 58–59 (discussing how one person would 
“grimly acknowledge” that he or she must go to the other if the only location that 
both recognize is where the other person is located); Lipton, supra note 21, at 867. 
26 David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Every-
thing, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019 
/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/3SDT-
JJKU]. 
27 See generally Addisu Lashitew, Building a Stakeholder Economy, BROOKINGS 
(Oct. 28, 2020) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/10/28/building-
a-stakeholder-economy/ [https://perma.cc/PG75-FAC7]. 
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and the most competitive alternative models.  It then situates 
shareholder wealth maximization within that constellation of 
theories.  Part III describes the provenance of Schelling points, 
how they arise from the existence of multiple equilibria and 
transaction costs, and how their coordinating power arises from 
their objectivity and intuitiveness.  Part IV explains how the 
simple, intuitive idea of shareholder wealth maximization fits the 
definition of a Schelling point.  It presents the core argument of 
this Article: that shareholder wealth maximization serves as a 
load-bearing coordinating function due to its contextual-intuitive-
ness that exists alongside, and perhaps even independent of, its 
current justifications.  That is, shareholder wealth maximization 
being a Schelling point that solves the costly bargaining problem 
in corporate law explains its persistence, if not its superiority.  
Part V is a brief conclusion. 
II.  THE THEORY AND DOCTRINE OF 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
Shareholder wealth maximization has a complex doctrinal 
and theoretical history.  Debates about it have been going on for 
quite some time.28  As a descriptive matter, there are debates 
over whether the norm truly exists at all and whether it is a 
binding legal principle or not.  One Delaware judge has answered 
this question with the claim that the norm is so doctrinally sound 
as to be very nearly beyond reasonable questioning,29 and a 
recent Delaware case reached the same conclusion.30  Normative-
ly, the primary justifications for shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion are that it is economically efficient31 and socially useful,32 
 
28 See infra Section II.A; see also George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate 
Purpose, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1319, 1320 (“Every few decades, there erupt political and 
academic debates over the proper nature and purpose of the corporation.”).  
29 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015) 
[hereinafter Dangers of Denial]. Nonetheless, Judge Strine has recently distributed 
a new paper arguing for formally changing much of this quite substantially. See Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal 
To Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and 
Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate 
Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging 
Investments in America’s Future 4 (U. Pa., Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsch., Paper No. 19-
39, 2019). 
30 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34–35 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
31 “Economically efficient,” for the moment, refers collectively to traditional 
principles of welfare economics, along with the contributions of transaction costs 
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and that it is generally equitable to shareholders and other 
parties to the corporate contract.33  Similar justifications include 
the cost-saving value of off-the-rack corporate default rules, 
which are premised upon the proposition that such rules should 
reflect what a majority of hypothetical bargainers would choose 
in a costless environment.34  The private ordering or bargaining 
that results as individuals contract around these defaults—or do 
not—reveals the most economically efficient terms.35  The pre-
vailing view of corporate law is “contractarian”; corporate law 
and governance consists of a nexus of interlocking contracts 
between various corporate constituents, not all of which are 
formally or extensively bargained.36  In particular, the contract 
with the shareholders of a large, public corporation is typically 
not bargained at all.37 
Nonetheless, there is intense debate over whether share-
holder wealth maximization is—descriptively—the law in Dela-
ware,38 and—normatively—whether it is actually economically 
superior, socially useful, or equitable to animate directors’ and 
 
economics and the new institutional economics. See William W. Bratton & Michael 
L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 499 
(2013); see also Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 
(1984) (drawing upon transaction costs economics to develop a framework for 
“contractual governance” between directors and shareholders). 
32 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. L. REV. 547, 549 (2003). 
33 At least one commentator has suggested that fairness follows from the overall 
economic efficiency gains of shareholder wealth maximization. See Mark J. Roe, The 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2063, 2065 (2001); Macey, supra note 19, at 185 (linking shareholder wealth 
maximization to the contractarian theory of the firm—that is, that the contract 
between the managers and directors on one side, and shareholders on the other, 
includes a term obligating the former to increase the value of the residual claim, 
since that is the only thing that the shareholders bargain for). 
34 See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1430–31 (defending, simultaneously, the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm and limited liability as transaction-costs-
reducing default rules within the corporate form); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 5, at 15. To some extent, this Article’s contribution hopefully will be to 
show that Schelling points represent the mechanics or plumbing of individuals 
working around the transaction costs they find in markets. 
35 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 34–35.  
36 Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1427. 
37 Green, supra note 22, at 1413–14; see also Utset, supra note 23. 
38 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 18, at 1189–90; Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 
1423–25 (“Delaware’s courts and legislature . . . are still our premier corporate 
lawmakers.”). 
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officers’ duties with such a legal rule.39  Descriptive arguments 
against shareholder wealth maximization include the dearth of 
clear doctrinal history supporting it, the lack of clarity in 
Delaware cases about the specificity of its requirements, and the 
rarity of its direct enforcement due to judicial deference to the 
authority of directors and officers.40  Normative arguments in-
clude charges that the norm does not necessarily or actually 
result in economic efficiency,41 that shareholders’ hypothetical 
and real private views of their own wealth and welfare are often 
rejected,42 and that maximizing shareholder wealth actually 
means imposing costs on other corporate constituents or on 
society that are not worth the economic gains.43  Similarly, some 
commentators propose that shareholder wealth maximization-
driven corporate governance should be reformed or reinterpreted 
such that it takes greater account of workers, environmental 
sustainability, and other non-financial social matters.  Scholars 
have at times theorized this as a “multifiduciary stakeholderist” 
model, while popular commentary has described related reforms 
as “corporate social responsibility” (“CSR”) or “environmental and 
social governance” (“ESG”).44  Collateral debates about the divi-
 
39 See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 163, 165 (2008); Green, supra note 22, at 1410–11; Mocsary, supra note 
28, at 1321. 
40 See Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1354; see also Bernard S. Sharfman, 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 389, 407 (2014).  
41 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280–81, 291–92 (1999) (arguing that the econom-
ic benefits of the corporate form flow from the conscious allocation of inputs and 
outputs by an independent hierarch—the board—rather than the board’s focus on 
maximizing the wealth of one class of corporate contributors—the shareholders). 
42 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1996) (arguing that 
corporate law treats shareholders as a legal fiction rather than drawing upon the 
actual desires of human shareholders); see also Lipton, supra note 21, at 865–66 
(elucidating the shifting sands in corporate law from the assumed desires of 
dispersed, uncommunicative shareholders to the actual preferences of institutional 
investors and others with expressed preferences). This is thought to undermine the 
case for private ordering. Id. at 882–83. 
43 See Caleb N. Griffin, The Hidden Cost of M&A, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 70, 
110 (without expressly arguing against shareholder wealth maximization, 
illustrating the extent to which it could produce social harms previously 
underappreciated in traditional law-and-economics scholarship).  
44 See generally James Mackintosh, A User’s Guide to the ESG Confusion, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-users-guide-to-the-
esg-confusion-11573563604 [https://perma.cc/9Q8S-QTVE].  
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sion of authority between management and shareholders,45 polic-
ing conflicts of interest,46 the question of whether wealth is to be 
maximized in the short- or long-term,47 and, as always, whether 
the decision maker should be the state or the private parties 
themselves48 also interact with discussion of shareholder wealth 
maximization.  
Purposely, this Article does not claim to move the ball one 
way or another on these debates.  Certainly, the contractarian 
case for shareholder wealth maximization is formidable.  Skep-
tics, though, have made persuasive arguments and presented 
thoughtful alternative models.  CSR/ESG reformers and the 
theorists who came before them also bring significant ideas to the 
table—ideas that corporate managers themselves are now argu-
ably taking seriously.49   Instead, this Article hopes to further the 
understanding of the function and operation of the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm by describing it as a Schelling point.  
This Section combines the component parts of any discussion 
of corporate law and governance: the theory of the firm as de-
veloped through economics and finance, the models developed in 
the legal scholarship, the scholarship on the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm itself, and the relevant doctrine. 
A. Economic Theories and Legal-Economic Models of the 
Corporation 
The modern theory of corporate law and governance is a heav-
ily economic one—in many ways the economics have over-
shadowed the doctrine, even as Delaware and other states have 
tended toward guiding the doctrine toward the economics.  At the 
outset, it is important to note that shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion largely operates in the background of much of the economic 
 
45 See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005). 
46 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 277–78 (1931); see also Bebchuk, supra note 45. 
47 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood 
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 
126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1884 (2017). 
48 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2004). 
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theory.50  This is in part because, as this Article has called it, 
shareholder wealth maximization might better be thought of as a 
norm51 than a binding—or default52—legal principle.53  It is, in 
fact, one of the many grounds on which the varying debates on 
shareholder wealth maximization take place.54  This Part makes 
an effort to corral all of these competing ideas, by providing a 
background in the current state of shareholder wealth maximi-
zation, the norm and the law, through a brief overview of the 
economic theories and legal doctrine associated with it. 
Today’s corporate law and economics begins with Professor 
Ronald Coase’s The Nature of the Firm, in which he argued that 
transaction costs—described in that article as the costs actors 
must incur to use the price mechanism—cause individuals to 
gather into firms to carry out economic activity.55  Perhaps 
implicit in Professor Coase’s work was that this was done 
according to contract-like agreement.56  Professor Coase observed 
that the economics of the time seemed to take as a given that 
either a firm or an individual could be “the” economic actor for 
the purpose of analyzing supply, demand, price, equilibrium, and 
allocation of resources questions.57  Professor Coase wondered 
why individual economic actors would choose to act collectively as 
a firm under the command and control of a boss or entrepre-
neur.58  Indeed, command-and-control was supposed to be the 
model competing with the market, where economic actors were 
thought to constantly be responding to prices transmitted through 
these market processes.59  But Professor Coase observed individ-
 
50 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
306 (1976) (noting that corporate managers don’t always “literally” maximize 
wealth).  
51 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of 
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 939 
& n.1 (2017) (citing JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES 
KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 32–33 (2008)). 
52 Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1342–43. 
53 The doctrine is discussed more thoroughly in Section III.D, infra.  
54 See Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1342. 
55 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937).  
56 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783–84 (1972). 
57 Coase, supra note 55, at 387. Then and now, the study of economics is about 
the allocation of resources. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 2 (9th 
ed. 2021). 
58 Coase, supra note 55 at 388. 
59 Id. at 390. 
682 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:671   
ual people inside firms responding to commands through a hier-
archy, where the person at the top was the one who responded to 
the prices.60 
Professor Coase concluded that no economic actor can par-
ticipate directly in the market process of responding to prices 
without expending some sort of cost.61  If that cost became too 
great, then the economic actor could not avail herself of the 
economic benefits of an exchange at the market price.  Thus, 
firms formed and entrepreneurs, on firms’ behalf, acted upon the 
prices developed in the market process.  Since Professor Coase 
proposed his theory of the firm, scholars have been working to 
develop a model of how law and economics work together to 
manage the transaction costs Professor Coase first observed.  
Following Professor Coase, Professors Armen Alchian and 
Harold Demsetz published their seminal work, “Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization.”62  They de-
scribed the firm as a “contractual structure” that developed to 
“enhanc[e] efficient organization of team production.”63  Profes-
sors Alchian and Demsetz provided one of the first formidable 
efforts at answering the questions Professor Coase’s observations 
first raised, as well as presenting their own set of questions.64  
Their exploration of the firm defined it as a set of contracts 
where a central agent serves as the common counterparty in 
contracts with all the inputs of production.  While Professor 
Coase focused on the costs associated with individuals using the 
market, Professors Alchian and Demsetz expanded the analysis 
to include the increased productivity created through “team 
production.”65  They also developed a framework for analyzing 
the extent to which firms must expend costs on monitoring em-
ployees and trying to prevent them from shirking, a natural 
problem in any team productive activity.  Their quibble with 
Professor Coase, if they had one, was Professor Coase’s framing 
of the firm as somehow an “authoritarian” process instead of a 
“contractual” one.66  For the purposes of this Article’s claims, the 
most important concept was the connection between what 
 
60 Id. at 390–91.  
61 Id. at 392.  
62 See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56.  
63 Id. at 794. 
64 Id. at 783–84. 
65 Id. at 779–81.  
66 Id. at 783.  
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Professor Alchian and Demsetz called the “central agent” and the 
“residual claim”67—that is, that the party holding the residual 
claim would be best incentivized to monitor the other inputs 
because that party is best incentivized to get the most surplus 
out of the team productive activity.68 
Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling, along with 
Professor Eugene Fama, continued crafting the theory, illustrat-
ing that the voluntary but authoritative system wherein manag-
ers and directors exercised wide discretion was the most efficient 
way to organize collective economic activity.69  Professors Jensen 
and Meckling’s most important proposition was that the corpora-
tion was a “nexus” of contracts between the various factors of 
production.70  This suggests the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm is a term of the implicit contract between the managers, 
directors, and shareholders.71  That is, corporate shareholders are 
trading investment capital to the firm in exchange for a slice of 
the residual claim, and, therefore, they should reasonably expect 
the managers and directors to maximize the value of the residual 
claim.  Professors Fama and Jensen’s later work developed an ex-
planation for why splitting the residual claim and assigning its 
monitoring function to the board of directors was a workable 
solution to the agency costs Professors Alchian, Demsetz, Jensen, 
 
67 The “residual claim” refers to the person who gets the surplus after all other 
inputs have been paid. As Professors Alchian and Demsetz described the capitalist 
firm, the shareholders would be the residual claimants, as they stood to benefit the 
most from income produced over and above what all other parts of the team are paid. 
68 One question Professors Alchian and Demsetz puzzled over, but did not quite 
answer, is how the splitting of the residual claim from the central monitoring agent 
and distributing it among a lot of shareholders in a corporation would serve to 
discipline the monitor for shirking his or her responsibility to discipline the other 
inputs. When the central agent is the residual claimant, incentives are, of course, 
aligned, and the right to the value of the residual claim disciplines the central 
monitoring agent. Professors Alchian and Demsetz observed that the shareholders 
would certainly not take any authority with their piece of the residual claim, and 
instead suggested that stockholders are basically just more optimistic bondholders. 
In the end, the connection between the open-ended residual claim and the central 
monitor suggests that the central monitor’s expected role is to increase the value of 
the residual claim. Professors Alchian and Demsetz credit Professor Henry Manne 
with the proposition that no shareholder would expect any sort of control. See also 
infra, Section II.A (discussing Manne); Williamson, supra note 31, at 1224–29.  
69 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 310. Professors Jensen and Meckling’s 
robust new economic explanation of the boundaries of the firm undermined the prior 
legal scholarship of Professors Berle and Means, who had argued that agency costs 
were and would continue to wipe out any gains from incorporation. See Bratton & 
Wachter, supra note 31, at 494–97. 
70 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 310. 
71 Id. at 311 & n.13; see also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 777, 794. 
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and Meckling had all been considering.72  In other words, while 
the shareholders would have the best incentives to monitor all 
the inputs, they will not because their individual share of the 
residual claim is so small and their relationship to the cor-
poration itself is so attenuated.  So the corporation places that 
monitoring authority in the hands of the board of directors. 
Professors Jensen and Meckling’s work connected to Profes-
sor Coase’s, as it appeared to identify the boundary of the firm 
and the market by framing it in terms of the “agency costs”73 
associated with the “nexus of contracts” underlying the legal 
fiction of the corporation.74  In the end, similar to Professors 
Alchian and Demsetz, Professors Jensen and Meckling concluded 
that the nexus of contracts associated with the firm was the way 
that “conflicting objectives of individuals . . . are brought into 
equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.”75  The 
engine of the analysis was a reframing of agency costs: rather 
than follow, for example, Professors Adolph Berle and Gardiner 
Means’s assumption that the positive quantity of agency costs 
ensured inefficiency, Professors Jensen and Meckling concluded 
that if the value of the production exceeded all relevant costs—
including agency costs—then joint production through firms was 
still wealth-enhancing.76  Finally, Professor Oliver Williamson 
also contributed a key observation to the research on corporate 
governance.  He explained why the residual claimants should be 
the principal and the managers and directors the agent—that is, 
because other creditors all could negotiate the terms of their 
arrangements, while the widely dispersed shareholders, who 
have little interest or ability to actually manage the corporation, 
cannot or simply do not negotiate the terms of their participation 
in the firm.77 
Professor Henry Manne contributed a well-developed legal 
model of the large, public corporation that presaged much of the 
economics and finance literature discussed above.  In “Our Two 
 
72 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 308–09 (1983). 
73 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 310. 
74 Fama & Jensen, supra note 72, at 302. 
75 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 311. 
76 Id. at 328 (citing Professor Demsetz’s “Nirvana” fallacy to reject claims that 
high agency costs would wash increased productivity from equilibrium organization 
of inputs). 
77 Williamson, supra note 31, at 1228. 
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Corporation Systems: Law and Economics”78 and “Mergers and 
the Market for Corporate Control,”79 Professor Manne argued, in 
part, that shareholders in large public corporations with freely 
tradeable shares were simply suppliers of investment capital.  
The management and control of the corporation were not the 
shareholders’ concern; they only wanted a return on their invest-
ment.  Professor Manne rebutted Professors Berle and Means’s the-
sis that shareholders were left out of control of the corporations 
in which they had invested by saying there was no reason that 
ordinary shareholders would or should expect to have any right 
of control over the corporation.  Professor Manne’s fundamental 
contribution was that shareholders are merely capital providers, 
not discretion-wielding entrepreneurs.  Professor Manne’s expla-
nation greatly influenced the later work of Professors Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, as he argued that the legal 
structure of large, public corporation law reflected the economics 
of specialized managers deploying capital from investors not 
particularly interested in management anyway.80   
Then-Professor Easterbrook81 and Professor Fischel’s series 
of articles, and later book, represented the summation of the 
impact of all the economics work on the law and had the 
profound effect of fully establishing the “contractarian” view of 
the corporation.  Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argued that 
the peculiar economics of collective business activity resulted in a 
corporate law that accurately reflected those economics and that 
this result was normatively good.82  Consistent with their con-
tractarian view, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel also contrib-
uted the most thorough argument that corporate legal rules 
should be default rules.  The default rules, in turn, should be 
discerned from what a majority of participants in markets for 
corporate shares would want and that mimicked that market’s 
selection of contract terms.83  Professors Easterbrook and Fischel 
 
78 Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. 
L. REV. 259, 264 (1967). 
79 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110, 112 (1965). 
80 Manne, supra note 78, at 261. 
81 Later, Professor Easterbrook would become Judge Easterbrook. 
82 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 4. Professors Easterbrook and 
Fischel and Professors Alchian and Demsetz naturally found substantial influence in 
the earlier work of Professor Henry Manne. See supra text accompanying notes 79–
80. 
83 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 15. 
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bridged the economics to the law, ultimately concluding, as 
Professor Manne had, that the law reflected the economics.84 
Among the strongest modern contributions to the contractar-
ian view of the firm is Professor Stephen Bainbridge’s “director 
primacy” model.  Professor Bainbridge’s work squared a rather 
stubborn circle in corporate law: Why, if the shareholders were to 
be the privileged class in corporate law, do courts give so much 
discretion to directors and managers?  Shouldn’t shareholder 
wealth maximization imply greater shareholder power?85  Of 
course, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel concluded, consistent 
with Professors Jensen and Meckling and others, that this was 
economically efficient.  Professor Bainbridge, though, mapped this 
directly onto the law, describing the intricate statutory and 
doctrinal connections that reflect the economically efficient separa-
tion of ownership and control.86  While the ends of corporate 
governance could be to ensure shareholder wealth, the means of 
doing so—as Professors Jensen and Meckling illustrated—was to 
vest power in an entrepreneur with command-and-control 
authority, as Professor Coase first observed.  In the Delaware 
corporation, the entrepreneur is the board.87  Consistent with this 
legal model, Professor Bainbridge has also done some of the most 
incisive work on majoritarian default rules and hypothetical 
bargaining. 
Often, shareholder wealth maximization is defended on the 
grounds of the hypothetical bargain.88  Likewise, the economic 
theory of default rules is that they are divined by reference to 
what a majority of people would want if they lived in a friction-
less world with unlimited time, capacity, and resources to 
bargain.89  This is also sometimes referred to as the “hypo-
thetical” bargain.  Along with the hypothetical bargain comes the 
notion that a majority of bargainers bargaining over the same 
term would reach a certain, efficient term.  A further extension of 
 
84 Id. 
85 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 452–53 (2001). 
86 Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 559, 572–73; see also Williamson, supra note 31 
(the board of directors is a special-purpose vehicle for managing the contract 
between the residual claimants and the corporation).  
87 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). The board, likewise, serves Professors 
Fama and Jensen’s monitoring function. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 72, at 303. 
88 Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1430. 
89 Id. 
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this theory is that actual bargains may reflect the appropriate 
default term and that evidence of majoritarian default suitability 
should be obtained by such observation, whether those bargains 
were “outcome” only observations or come with evidence of the 
parties negotiation over the term.90  At minimum, it would ap-
pear, shareholder wealth maximization might be thought of as 
the default corporate purpose under the law-and-economics, 
hypothetical bargaining model of the corporation.91 
B. Other Models 
1. Shareholder Primacy 
Shareholder primacy is not an alternate model to share-
holder wealth maximization, as it holds that shareholders are the 
privileged class in the corporation.  As Professor Bainbridge 
describes, shareholder primacy and director primacy serve the 
same end: the maximization of shareholder wealth.  Shareholder 
primacy, though, tends to reach back to Professors Berle and 
Means, suggesting that greater shareholder power is necessary to 
truly give effect to shareholder wealth maximization.  Professor 
Lucian Bebchuk is the most prominent shareholder primacy 
advocate, and his work reflects a view not necessarily in tension 
with shareholder wealth maximization, but rather with how to 
get there.92  Taking up the challenge from Berle and Means, who 
ultimately thought that great managerial authority within the 
corporate form would result in the shareholders’ wealth never 
being maximized, Professor Bebchuk’s proposed reforms aimed at 
giving shareholders more actual control through more substan-
tial voting rights, director independence, and other shareholder 
control devices.93  Contrary to Professor Bainbridge, Professor 
Bebchuk proposes that shareholders themselves, rather than 
managers and directors, are in a better position to turn their own 
interests into corporate policy, especially where managers are 
using their power to feather their own nests or consume other 
private benefits of control.94 
 
90 Id. at 1428–29. 
91 See Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1342. 
92 See Bebchuck, supra note 45, at 838. 
93 Id. at 836–37. 
94 Id. at 898–99, 911–13.  
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2. Team Production 
Distinguished from Professors Alchian and Demsetz, who re-
ferred to the firm as a model of team production, Professors 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout developed what is now known as 
the “team production” model of corporate law.  In that model, the 
board is a “mediating hierarch” that connects and manages all of 
the factors of production needed for the team production.  
According to Professors Blair and Stout, Professors Alchian and 
Demsetz’s analysis stopped short of a very important question 
about the nature of team production: How does it grow, change, 
or recede over time?95 Moreover, how should the firm account for 
firm-specific investments in human capital?  The answer to these 
questions, and others, led Professors Blair and Stout to conclude 
that corporate purpose, as executed by the board as mediating 
hierarch, was to find the best and most efficient way to produce 
whatever goods or services the corporation was producing, rather 
than serving shareholders—or anyone else, for that matter.  The 
unique and searing insight is that corporations need not be run 
in the interest of any one constituent to be run well; they just 
need to be run well. 
3. Multi-Fiduciary or Stakeholderist 
The multi-fiduciary stakeholderist model originated with Pro-
fessor E. Merrick Dodd’s response to Professors Berle and Means, 
but it largely caught literary fire among scholars of manage-
ment.96  The normative claim is that all “stakeholders” have 
intrinsic value to the corporation and therefore are worthy of 
management’s consideration.97  As Professor Ronald Green put it, 
when contrasting the stakeholder model with the prevailing 
shareholder wealth maximization model, “[t]he difference will 
become apparent whenever corporate decisions arise in which 
acting on moral, as opposed to legal, responsibilities to other 
constituencies cannot readily be justified in terms of long-term 
shareholder gain.”98   
This fundamental idea is foundational to the more political 
theories of CSR and ESG.  It likely underpins, for example, 2020 
 
95 Blair & Stout, supra note 41, at 275. 
96 See generally Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of 
the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65 
(1995). 
97 Id. at 67. 
98 Green, supra note 22, at 1419.  
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United States presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s plan to 
create a federal chartering system for very large corporations.99  
It certainly motivated the Business Roundtable’s late-2019 state-
ment that signatory CEOs would be sure to keep stakeholders in 
mind when making corporate decisions.100  It is not entirely clear 
whether the Roundtable meant that CEOs would do so because 
that is best for the shareholders in the long run, or, as Professor 
Green prescribes, would do so even when it is not best for the 
shareholders.101 
Team production, stakeholderist, and modern social responsi-
bility initiatives reject shareholder wealth maximization, whether 
on legal, moral, or economic grounds. 
C. Doctrine: Dodge, eBay, and Whether Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Is a Binding Legal Principle 
Shareholder wealth maximization as a matter of law is 
complex.  Several scholars have recently tried to put together the 
sparse case law with statutes and other sources of corporate 
operational law in a rigorous effort to link all these sources of 
corporate law to the shareholder wealth maximization norm.102  
Unavoidably, the doctrine leaves these scholars a bit wanting for 
a good definition of shareholder wealth maximization, how it is 
implemented, whether it is of mandatory legal force, and if it is, 
what the law actually requires.  This Section tours the seminal 
cases, blending in some of this recent work and how it interacts 
with the cases. 
The seminal case on shareholder wealth maximization is 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,103 a 1919 decision of the Michigan Su-
preme Court.  It held:  
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to 
be employed for that end.  The discretion of directors is to be 
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not 
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, 
 
99 Accountable Capitalism Act, ELIZABETH WARREN (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www 
.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Accountable%20Capitalism%20Act%20One-Pager 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3GA-QBJW]. 
100 See Gellas & Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 26. 
101 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1433. 
102 See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 51. 
103 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  
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or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order 
to devote them to other purposes.104 
The dispute in the case involved whether Henry Ford, as a 
director of the Ford Motor Company, had violated his fiduciary 
duties by retaining the corporation’s substantial earnings instead 
of distributing them to shareholders.105  Part of Ford’s rationale 
was that he intended, basically, to continue growing the busi-
ness.106  Another part involved lowering the prices of Ford 
automobiles and otherwise running the business as, according to 
the court, “a semi-eleemosynary institution and not as a business 
institution.”107  The court permitted what it apparently viewed as 
a legitimate business expansion, but sought to chasten Ford in 
his vision of a corporation run for the good of the “general public” 
or “to benefit mankind at the expense” of the stockholders.108  
Also notable, the court in dicta proposed that it would have 
permitted a number of actions that seemed to enrich other stake-
holders.109  It gave the example of permitting Ford to build a 
hospital solely to treat sick and injured Ford employees, which, 
naturally, would result in a great expenditure of the surplus that 
the court ultimately ordered to be distributed to the Dodge 
brothers and the other shareholders.110   
Dodge has been subject to scholarly criticism and alternative 
interpretation.  Professor Stout’s admonition to corporate law 
professors, “Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford,” is the 
best reflection of the criticism of Dodge.  For starters, Professor 
Stout notes that the language quoted above is only dicta, under-
mining any claim that Dodge accurately reflects a principle of 
corporate law.111  Dodge’s second major strike is that courts rarely 
enforce a purpose of wealth maximization directly and often 
expressly permit directors to make decisions that have a dubious 
or contrived relationship to shareholder wealth.  The same goes 
for corporate charters and statutes.  Finally, Professor Stout 
 
104 Id. at 684. 
105 Id. at 670–71. 
106 Id. at 671. 
107 Id. at 683. 
108 Id. at 684. 
109 Id. at 683–84.  
110 Id. at 684. 
111 Stout, supra note 39, at 167–68. Professor Stout also categorizes Dodge as 
weak precedent because of its age and the fact that it was decided outside Delaware. 
The holding of the case, according to Professor Stout, essentially is that Henry Ford, 
as a controlling shareholder, oppressed the Dodge brothers, thus violating the duty 
the controller owes the minority. Id. at 166–68. 
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rejects the economic basis of shareholder wealth maximization, 
suggesting that privileging shareholder wealth reduces the rela-
tive value of debt claims, chills non-shareholder contributions to 
team production, and produces externalities to non-shareholder 
constituencies.  Professor Stout’s rejection of Dodge perhaps sug-
gests it is more avatar than doctrine—that is, to the extent 
shareholder wealth maximization is or is not the law, Dodge is 
“weak precedent.”  Her arguments against Dodge, whether it is 
conceived of as avatar or precedent, represent a substantial 
criticism of shareholder wealth maximization itself. 
As Professor Stout noted, at the time Dodge was decided, 
Delaware had not clearly stated as its law that shareholder 
wealth maximization was the mandatory or even default 
corporate purpose.112  This would largely change a few short 
years later, when the Court of Chancery decided eBay Domestic 
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark.113  There, the Court faced a dispute 
over several defensive measures Craig Newmark and James 
“Jim” Buckmaster had taken to preserve their control over the 
corporate future of Craigslist, Inc.  Echoing Henry Ford, Craig 
and Jim “prove[d] that they personally believe[d] craigslist 
should not be about the business of stockholder wealth 
maximization.”114  The Chancellor concluded that this was 
impermissible, articulating the norm as follows: “[D]irectors are 
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany [the 
corporate] form.  Those standards include acting to promote the 
value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”115  
Perhaps former Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court 
put it most clearly when he called for a “clear-eyed” acceptance of 
the norm as the law.116  
D. Why a Renegotiation of the Norm Now? 
At one time, some thought that shareholder primacy (at least 
as an end of corporate governance, if not necessarily predicting a 
means) had reached the end of its history.117  To the extent this 
 
112 Id. at 169. 
113 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
116 Strine, Dangers of Denial, supra note 29, at 761, 768. 
117 See generally, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 85 (discussing the forces 
driving the emergence and establishment of the shareholder-oriented model as the 
“standard model” for corporate governance across jurisdictions). 
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primacy-framed end is co-extensive with shareholder wealth maxi-
mization, it leaves one wondering why shareholder wealth maxi-
mization is again an object of public criticism and debate.  One 
possibility is just that societies change over time, and whatever 
moment in time that gave rise to and preserved shareholder 
wealth maximization is now simply passing on.118  Another possi-
bility is that the downstream justifications are weakening a bit, 
as no one can come to a consensus on the optimal organization of 
the corporation in the first place.  As Professor Bainbridge aptly 
noted a number of years ago, the law-and-economics scholars who 
contributed so much to corporate law and doctrine and those 
holding onto hope of drawing back on those contributions are 
simply talking past one another.119  Finally, as has happened 
before, mainstream politics is taking seriously the economic and 
social power that has accumulated in very large corporations.  
Some have expressed concern that this economic and social power 
has inured only to the benefit of these corporations’ managers, 
directors, and shareholders and therefore is suspect.  Similarly, 
others focus on the potential for corporations to use their powers 
for the greater good of all constituents, rather than just the good 
of those who happen to own shares. 
This Article purposely avoids taking positions on these de-
bates, whether the academic one about the nature, provenance, 
or desirability of shareholder wealth maximization or the public 
one about managing corporate power and influence.  Instead, 
since both tend to grapple with the meaning, consequences, and 
potential for reform of shareholder wealth maximization, I hope 
to contribute to the understanding of how the norm works.  To 
that end, this Article presents shareholder wealth maximization 
as a Schelling point: an intuitive and objective norm that permits 
productive coordination of economic actors by getting everyone on 
the same page.   
III.  COORDINATION GAMES, SCHELLING POINTS 
Economist Thomas Schelling was the first to conceptualize 
the focal point, and the concept bears his name in common 
 
118 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 21, at 867–70 (describing that shareholders are 
no longer quiescent and disengaged). 
119 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractar-
ian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 
859–60 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 
1995)). 
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vernacular.120  He developed it from a strategy he and traveling 
companions used to find each other when they might have been 
separated.121  Everyone agreed that if anyone got lost anywhere 
the party traveled, they would always find each other at the city’s 
town hall, police station, or post office.122   
Professor Schelling also occasionally tested the New York 
City game repeated in this Article’s introduction on his students, 
finding often that important landmarks and intuitively selected 
times coordinated his students.123  More than a simple game, 
Professor Schelling viewed this as a way that people coordinate 
their activities, so to reap gains from that coordinated action.124  
There is little legal scholarship on whether Schelling points shed 
any light on law, but the work that has been done is intriguing.125  
For example, Professor David Friedman uses the concept as a 
foundation for his work, “A Positive Account of Property Rights,” 
arguing that focal points provided a useful theoretical expla-
nation for the existence of property rights, which in turn gave 
rise to the ability to contract over them.126  Additionally, Profes-
sor Robert Ahdieh aptly argued that boilerplate terms become 
focal points that contracting parties can use to obtain strategic 
bargaining leverage, thus divorcing the use of the boilerplate 
term from its actual meaning and has described the regulatory 
state as a source of coordination points.127 
A. Coordination Games 
A “coordination game” is a game theory concept where players 
in an experiment must coordinate with one another to obtain 
prizes.  A pure coordination game is one without any conflict.  
 
120 See Interview: Thomas Schelling, REGION FOCUS, Spring 2005, at 36, 36; see 
also SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 57, 111. 
121 Interview: Thomas Schelling, supra note 120, at 36–37. 
122 Id. 
123 Id.; see also SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 55–56, 55 n.1. 
124 SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 55–58. 
125 See generally Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) (describing and evaluating the role of legal rules and 
institutions in generating focal points). 
126 Friedman, supra note 13, at 15–16. 
127 Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1037. Professor Ahdieh also proposed that boiler-
plate terms saved on transaction costs, though Professor Ahdieh’s article separates 
this from the Schelling point analysis. See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67–68 
(explaining that people often use past transactions as a framework for future ones); 
see also Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the 
Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 598 (2010) (describing the regulatory 
function as a producer of coordination points).  
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For example, the New York game show example at the beginning 
of this Article is almost pure coordination.  That is, each party 
wins a declared prize where the total surplus is already split.128  
Other coordination games have a conflict component, usually 
over how to split a given surplus.129  As Professor Ahdieh ex-
plains, all contract bargaining can be viewed as a coordination 
game with a varying degree of embedded conflict.130 
Coordination games often have multiple—perhaps even very 
many—equilibria.  To coordinate, the parties must choose one.  
Sometimes the payoff is the same regardless of which one they 
choose, but other times the payoff might be less if they pick the 
“wrong” one.  Critically, though, that payoff might be greater 
than zero.  A Schelling point that results in greater than zero 
net131 value from coordination might not be optimal, as there 
could be another equilibrium with yet greater value.  Even so, 
the sum of the value that does exist at the Schelling point and 
the avoidance of whatever costs might have been expended to 
achieve the optimum being greater than zero suggests a mutually 
and socially beneficial exchange, even if it isn’t the best possible 
exchange.  This, perhaps, often reflects the real world.132  
B. Transaction Costs 
In any game with multiple coordination points, there are 
three types of transaction costs: the costs of selecting the equi-
librium, the costs of implementing it, and the costs of bargaining 
over the first two.  For example, in the New York City game,133 
the parties have to choose a point of coordination and then will 
have to expend costs to get from their locations to the Empire 
State Building via taxi, rideshare, or perhaps the subway.  In the 
 
128 Cooter, supra note 7, at 4. A true pure coordination game would involve the 
parties sitting across a table from one another already, trying to divide a dollar bill 
or pick a common square. The New York City example admits of the possibility that 
there is some conflict about whether to meet closer or further away from one party 
or the other. Cf. SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
129 Friedman, supra note 13, at 5–6 (“It is in my interest . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
130 Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1039–40, 1051. 
131 The value at the Schelling point will also include a reduction in bargaining 
costs. See EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 34–35 (describing the 
economizing effect of legal default rules). 
132 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 332, 352 (describing how real-life 
firm structures reflect the economic benefits, costs, and tradeoffs that exist in the 
real world). 
133 See supra Part I. 
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tacit version of the game, where the parties cannot communicate, 
the cost of selecting the equilibrium is extremely high and there 
are no bargaining costs because there can be no bargaining.  The 
cost of implementing the Empire State Building solution might 
be greater than selecting the equidistant point between them, 
but due to the high costs of consciously choosing the point of 
coordination, there is no way to reduce them.  Such costs do not 
necessarily evaporate with full communication, and new costs 
emerge.  Perhaps the parties would then bargain over the meet-
ing point and that bargaining would include considerations of 
each side’s starting location.  In this case, choosing a Schelling 
point reduces the bargaining costs. 
Similarly, in some games, the only solution is for one side to 
expend more resources to obtain the nominal prize.  Professor 
Schelling’s example is a game where two soldiers parachute into 
a remote location, but their communication is limited by the fact 
that one soldier’s walkie-talkie is only able to transmit whereas 
the other is only able to receive.  In that case, the typical person 
playing the game as the receiving player will grudgingly solve 
the game by agreeing that she will make the trek to the location 
of the transmitting player who, of course, can transmit her 
position to the receiving player.134  One player expends minimal 
transaction costs, while the other expends much more.  These 
scenarios illustrate how Schelling points represent workable, but 
perhaps suboptimal, solutions.  And that sometimes workable, 
suboptimal solutions are superior to no solution at all.  In tacit 
bargaining, the Schelling point solves the insurmountable prob-
lem of literally not being able to agree on the coordination point.  
In explicit bargaining, it can solve the problem of avoiding the 
costs of continued or deadlocked bargaining.  
C. Multiple Equilibria 
A Schelling point is useful if there is more than one potential 
solution to a game.  That is, there are multiple equilibria.  Sup-
pose a person is buying a car from a dealership.  The dealership 
wants to achieve the maximum purchase price, while the buyer 
wants to achieve the minimum.  The most the buyer will pay is 
$20,000 and the least that the dealership will accept is $18,000.  
If the buyer was aware of the dealership’s price and could 
 
134 SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 59. 
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credibly communicate firmness of her offer,135 she could just offer 
$18,000 when she walked in the door and leave with the car.  If 
the dealership was aware of the buyer’s price and could credibly 
communicate firmness of its offer, the salespersons would offer 
her the car for $20,000 and she would take it and leave with the 
car.  Thus, there are equilibria anywhere from $18,000 to $20,000 
where the parties would strike a mutually beneficial deal.  This 
is the surplus that must be divided for the transaction to occur.  
From a wealth perspective, any dollar less than $20,000 is 
increased wealth for the buyer and any dollar over $18,000 is 
increased wealth for the dealership, but regardless of the division 
of the wealth, total wealth is the same. 
What would you expect to happen?  Given two serious buy/sell 
offers of $18,000 and $20,000, and since neither side can credibly 
communicate the firmness of its offer, the most common outcome 
is likely that the two parties would “split the difference” and 
make a trade at $19,000.136  This is what Professor Schelling’s 
theory would predict—the number equally between the two 
bounds is the natural endpoint where both sides are happy but 
not worrying about whether either ceded too much surplus to the 
other. 
Of course, that does not have to be true.  Each of the parties 
could still work to obtain a bigger slice of surplus residing be-
tween the equilibria—that is, they could expend more bargaining 
costs.137  What if the dealership were struggling financially and 
could use the extra money?  What if the buyer were less wealthy 
than the dealership owner and the marginal value of each extra 
dollar had greater utility to her than the owner?  This might 
suggest that, from a utility or wealth perspective, relatively 
greater utility might exist if one party or the other obtained more 
of the surplus, even though the total wealth is the same.  Simi-
larly, the parties may dig in, and expend more transaction costs 
to either arrive at—or not arrive at—a different equilibrium. 
Professor Robert Cooter explained that sometimes the point 
at which mutually beneficial cooperation will or will not occur is 
a factor of being unable to bargain to an agreement over the 
surplus.138  Professor Cooter argued this was true regardless of 
 
135 This is important because, in reality, both sides have reason to believe the 
other is bluffing about the firmness of the offer. Friedman, supra note 13, at 6. 
136 See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67.  
137 Cooter, supra note 7, at 17, 20–21. 
138 Id. at 4. 
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transaction costs and even argued that reducing transaction costs 
could have the perverse incentive of leading the parties to play 
chicken over the division of the surplus past the point where 
cooperation could be reached. 
But what Professor Cooter was not seeking to address is how 
these bargains actually get done when they do get done.  The last 
step—the piece of the puzzle that solves the problem—is the 
Schelling point, which very often is “split[ting] the difference.”139  
Again, it is not necessarily the logical outcome, and in fact may 
be logically irrelevant.  That is, splitting the difference does not 
naturally split the surplus fairly or optimally.  It just splits the 
surplus.  Numerous optimizations could all be constructed into a 
precise model—or the parties, facing the costs of continued 
bargaining or losing the deal altogether, could just settle on 
$19,000, a number both parties intuitively understand as both 
increasing their utility and receiving a fair deal.140 
D. The Power of the Focal Point—Contextual Intuitiveness 
Professor Schelling argued that this phenomenon of bargain-
ing behavior was more than a quirk or random element of human 
conduct.  His own informal experiments, and several others since, 
illustrate the unusually high likelihood that people can and will 
solve coordination problems without the aid of communication 
and that this extends to circumstances where people can literally 
communicate, but cannot effectively communicate sincerity or 
firmness.141  In the example above, it is obviously in the car 
dealership’s interest to convince the buyer that it will not sell the 
car for less than $20,000, even though this is not true, so the 
buyer simply might find the salesperson’s claim that it will not 
sell the car for less than $20,000 unbelievable.  The same is true 
of the buyer—the dealership simply might disbelieve her claim 
that she will not pay more than $18,000.  A small move by either 
party will fail to communicate credibility, because both parties 
will again conclude the other is not telling the truth.  Small 
moves in either direction suffer from the same issue.  If the deal-
er simply knocks off another $500 and says “best and final,” the 
 
139 SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67.  
140 It is also possible that this just does not happen, but that does not undermine 
the observation that it must happen quite often. See Donald J. Boudreaux, The 
Coase Theorem and Strategic Bargaining, in 3 ADVANCES IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 
95, 101 (Peter J. Boettke & David L. Prychitko eds., 1996).  
141 Friedman, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
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buyer may simply add $500 to her offer and also say “best and 
final,” arguably signaling her disbelief that the dealer’s offer was 
not actually its best and final, but failing to signal that her new 
offer was her best and final.  This, of course, costs the parties 
more in bargaining costs.  Professor Schelling’s solution is that if 
there is a focal point in the bargain, this point is where the 
parties can conclude it.142  In this sort of bargain, splitting the 
difference between the most recent two “serious” offers usually 
gets the deal done.143  Perhaps there indeed was a little bit more 
value in either direction—the dealership could have squeezed a 
bit more from her or she from it, but the “split-the-difference” 
model stands out in everyone’s mind as at least generally “fair.”  
IV.  THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION NORM IS A 
SCHELLING POINT FOR COORDINATING DIVIDED OWNERSHIP OF 
EQUITY INTERESTS IN BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
Bargaining within the context of the public corporation is 
cost-prohibitive.144  In fact, it is not exactly cheap in the non-
public context either.  These transaction costs, were they to be 
incurred, might wash the prospect of a deal at all.  So, parties 
simply do not incur them.145  Instead, they simply do not select 
terms and just go into business together on the basis of trust, 
unspoken understanding, or just bare incomplete terms.146  Since 
the law-and-economics revolution in corporate law, 
commentators have proposed that the corporate law should 
provide off-the-rack default terms to complete corporate 
contracts, so that when the corporate bargainers choose to forgo 
transaction costs, there will be a clear legal rule for resolving any 
dispute that might arise later.147  Such an approach likely reflects 
Delaware law and the law in most other states.148   Commentators 
have long justified these off-the-rack default terms as the 
predicted or observed outcomes of hypothetical or actual 
 
142 SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 70. 
143 Id. at 111. 
144 Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1427−29; see also supra Part I. 
145 Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1071; see Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The 
Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 61–62 (2017) 
(contesting the notion that business transaction drafting is the result of 
“distinctively crafted” final documents). 
146 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 
(Mass. 1975). 
147 See supra Section II.A. 
148 See supra Part II. 
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bargains, justifying the legal system’s application of such default 
terms as carrying out a majoritarian preference.149  That is, as 
the process unfolds, efficient rules will be revealed as parties 
contract around the default rules, or do not contract around 
them.150  Such an explanation is a very good one for why courts 
should enforce default rules instead of mandatory rules and is 
generally a good fit for the idea that corporations are voluntary 
associations of private individuals pursuing private ends, but 
critics have argued that some default rules may still be 
suboptimal.  
This version of law and economics is very persuasive, but so 
have been very thoroughgoing critiques.151  Schelling point theory 
is not so easy to undermine, in part because it rests less on the 
assumptions commonly needed to model allocative efficiency and 
at least implicitly concedes that the outcomes may not be the 
optimal outcomes.  Instead, Schelling point theory suggests that 
being a part of the corporate bargain that exists under an 
arguably suboptimal shareholder wealth maximization regime is 
superior to not participating in the corporate bargain at all.152  
Schelling point theory explains why, within the context of 
business associations, so many people can coordinate to found 
and run so many business ventures without being overwhelmed 
by transaction costs.153   
This Part describes the process of coordinating capital 
investments from large numbers of dispersed and rationally 
uninformed investors, the transaction costs associated with that 
process, and the multiple equilibria that can be reached within it.  
This Part presents this Article’s core argument: shareholder 
wealth maximization is persistent because it permits coordina-
tion at a productive equilibrium and minimizes transaction costs 




149 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 20–22. 
150 Id. at 21–22. 
151 See supra Section II.A. 
152 Cf. Theodore N. Mirvis, Paul K. Rowe & William Savitt, Bebchuk’s “Case for 
Increasing Shareholder Power”: An Opposition, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 43, 44–45 
(2007) (discussing the extent to which the United States corporate governance sys-
tem has “performed admirably”).  
153 As Professor Mocsary argued, the corporate form itself could be described as 
a Schelling point. Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1338 & n.94. 
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A. Coordinating Capital and the Production of Goods and 
Services 
Large corporations exist because it often takes a large 
amount of organized resources to undertake long-term and very 
expensive projects.154  These long-term projects take a lot of 
money, which is locked in over a long period of time.155  Almost no 
individual corporate manager or director, or any other individual 
person, has enough capital to contribute in this manner.  Even if 
an individual person did have enough capital, most people 
diversify their holdings and will not put all of their money into a 
single large enterprise.156  Likewise, single banks typically do not 
commit that level of capital to a single loan, either, as they must 
diversify lending risk in the interest of their own shareholders—
not to mention depositors. 
One possibility is to conduct all necessary activity for the 
production of all goods and services in person-to-person trans-
actions in spot markets, but, as Professor Coase recognized, this 
is not feasible.157  Another possibility is for small groups of people 
who can communicate and coordinate easily to undertake proj-
ects by pooling their capital.158  This may not always scale to the 
level needed to conduct such complex activities as cracking 
petroleum for ethane or manufacturing commercial aircrafts.159  
Thus, large corporations exist, and they simply must accumulate 
capital at a rate that requires dispersed public investment of 
some kind. 
Notably, a “bond” is a specific type of financial contract, the 
basic terms of which are well-understood.160  Another way, as 
Professor Ronald Gilson once described as the mode of corporate 
 
154 Coase, supra note 55, at 396–97; Blair & Stout, supra note 41, at 322; ADAM 
SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
278 (George Bell & Sons ed. 1908) (1776). 
155 See Stout, supra note 18, at 1194; see also Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as 
a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the 
Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 685–86 (2015). 
156 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 779, 787–88. 
157 Coase, supra note 55, at 387–89. 
158 This is the traditional partnership or close corporation model. 
159 This is not to say private companies with a large geographic footprint and high 
revenues cannot function without dispersed public investment, but even private 
investment pools obtain capital at some point in the financing chain from more than 
a single person. For example, private equity firms obtain capital from a smaller 
number of wealthier investors. 
160 It is a transaction-cost-reducing innovation that allows corporations to ac-
cumulate capital from dispersed investors. 
2020] SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 701 
operation in Germany and Japan, is to fund large corporations 
with equity capital mostly from banks, which have their own en-
gaged managers.161  These banks, of course, accumulate capital in 
the form of deposits and other more conservative individual in-
vestments.162   
Corporations simply must accumulate a large amount of cap-
ital and American corporations have typically pursued capital 
from many dispersed individual investors.163  With a broad pool of 
direct investors, transaction costs begin to emerge on both sides 
of the deal.  The transaction costs of selling equity—at least in 
the manner conducted in the United States—are dealt with, in 
part, through the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 
1. Transaction Costs 
Within the corporate contract, directors and managers acting 
on behalf of the corporation and investors deciding whether to 
purchase shares face transaction costs.  On the corporation side, 
directors have to construct a bundle of economic and control 
rights to appeal to investors.  In non-public corporations, direc-
tors, who are often founders and entrepreneurs, can bargain with 
potential investors face-to-face over various economic and control 
rights.  Directors, upon choosing to offer shares to the public at-
large, can no longer bargain face-to-face with investors.164  With-
out the ability to actually bargain over terms and conditions of 
share ownership, the directors and managers have to make 
guesses at what the public wants, and make that the bundle of 
economic and control rights they will offer to public investors.  
Corporate finance practice has settled on a share of common 
stock as having a set of typical economic features, including, for 
example, the residual claim and potentially sometimes divi-
dends.165  Different firms may offer different bundles of rights for 
 
161 Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do 
Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 327–28 (1996). 
162 Mark J. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1673, 1678–79 (2002). 
163 Nonetheless, “institutional investors” such as pension funds, mutual funds, 
and other investment vehicles own a large percentage of the current equity market 
capitalization. 
164 Green, supra note 22, at 1411–12 (criticizing the hypothetical bargain meth-
odology); see also Utset, supra note 23. 
165 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 10–11, 36–37 (discussing the 
nature of “stock” and the ways that different governance terms emerge from firms 
experimenting with them).  
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various reasons—for example, dual-class stock166—but the con-
vergence is striking.167  The feature the directors and officers rare-
ly fail to offer is shareholder wealth maximization as a funda-
mental norm—in fact, such a norm is the thing that makes the 
residual claim valuable.168  Even if the content of shareholder 
wealth maximization is not always discernible or optimal, the com-
munication from the managers and directors to the shareholders 
that they will be doing their best to maximize the shareholders’ 
wealth is a commitment that has to be made.169 
On the investor side, investors have to figure out what kinds 
of companies they want to invest in and what level of risk they 
are comfortable taking, and then also find out actual details 
about the company and its business.  These are actions that 
many investors are rationally unwilling to take, both before and 
after making investments.170  A bargain that consisted of “invest 
your money with us, the professional managers, and we will do 
whatever we want with it” would not be expected to earn much 
investment at all.171  A complex bargain that rigidly promised a 
certain dollar amount of return per dollar invested, or the like, 
would be preferred stock or a bond which can be offered with 
lower transaction costs, but importantly, with financial returns 
limited by their terms.172  Investors who invest in common stock 
simply would not, rationally, have any way to bargain with 
directors and managers over the terms of their relationship, nor 
would directors and managers find it worthwhile to do so.173 
 
166 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate 
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 806–07 (2017). 
167 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 36–37.  
168 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 789 n.14. 
169 Cf. Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1037, 1062 (discussing how certain terms signal 
much more than their actual content).  
170 See generally James Martineau, The Importance for Trustees To Understand 
Their Tolerance to Investment Risk, 15 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 626 (2009); Cf. Jeff 
Brown, How Investors Can Check for Risk, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: MONEY (Dec. 
10, 2018, 11:27 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/funds/articles/how-investors-
can-check-for-risk [https://perma.cc/RV7R-VTXY] (exploring the difficulty of assess-
ing interacting risks within a portfolio). 
171 Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1441–43, 1443 n.72 (explaining that share-
holders are not a bottomless tap of money for corporations to use for whatever 
purposes managers choose which is, of course, true due to market constraints to 
some extent, but also due to legal ones). 
172 This would not attract “optimistic” investors—or, at minimum, risk-takers—
because the upside is limited. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 789 n.14. 
173 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 119, at 870–71, 875–76 (providing the example of 
a take-it-or-leave-it contract for a rental car as an illustration of “outcome 
bargain[ing]”). 
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If this were the whole story, then one would never have ex-
pected to see large corporations conducting so much business in 
the global economy.174  Shareholder wealth maximization solves 
this problem because it is a Schelling point for both sides: direc-
tors, managers, and shareholders understand that maximizing 
shareholder wealth is a fundamental norm.  Shareholders com-
mit their existing wealth with the understanding that their 
future wealth will be maximized not due to choosing to take a 
particular amount in return—like a bond—but through the 
increase in the value of the firm that arises through the labor 
and efforts of the managers and directors oriented toward the 
goal of maximizing that value.175   
Firms exist because organizing economic activity into firms 
solves some of the transaction-cost problems associated with 
bargaining large, costly, risky, and long-term projects, but it does 
not solve all transaction costs problems.  Bargaining with the 
providers of equity capital is cost-prohibitive, so having a 
Schelling point reduces or eliminates those costs.176  The firm, 
whether in the corporate form or in another business entity form, 
reduces transaction costs associated with hiring factors of 
production such as purchasing machinery and employing labor.  
Likewise, it lowers the transaction costs of obtaining credit.177  
But, since the firm uses a lot of equity capital, and trades it for 
the residual claim, there emerges a new set of transaction costs 
specific to the firm: agency costs.178  Professors Easterbrook and 
Fischel, among others, observed that the public stock markets 
dealt quite well with these costs.  The thesis of their economic 
analysis of the corporation was that equity markets would 
reward good managers and directors and punish bad ones.179  In 
 
174 Cf. SMITH, supra note 154, at 26 (noting “division of labour” is limited by the 
“extent of the market”). 
175 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 787–88; see also Letter from War-
ren Buffet, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to Berkshire Hathaway 
S’holders at 3–4, 11 (Feb. 22, 2020) (on file with author) (describing the 
“compound[ing]” nature of retained earnings). 
176 See supra Section III.B. 
177 Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1338 (describing the corporation itself as a Schelling 
point for gathering and deploying resources). 
178 See supra Section II.A. As Professors Goshen and Squire aptly argue, agency 
costs are not the only transaction costs associated with the relationship between 
shareholders, managers, and directors. Shareholder control devices can create “prin-
cipal costs” which are also transaction costs embedded in the corporate contract. 
Goshen & Squire, supra note 166, at 770–71. 
179 That is, lower share prices suggest poor management, and higher share 
prices suggest better management, as market participants sold off stocks of poorly 
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that process, corporations would adopt the governance forms that 
best enabled them to sell stock, and corporations stubbornly 
insisting otherwise would sell less stock or see their prices fail to 
keep pace with the better-governed firms.   
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel’s analysis rests on the 
assumption that market prices reflect a level of conscious choice—
which they do.  The question is what is the conscious choice?  Is it 
a choice based on all market participants individually pricing the 
substantive features of particular governance forms, or is it some, 
perhaps even many, market participants accepting a Schelling 
point that happens to contain those substantive features?180  It is 
one thing to assume that shareholders are rationally ignorant 
but another thing to assume that rationally ignorant share-
holders will make so many “good” choices through consciously 
weighing and balancing different substantive governance choices.  
The connection is the Schelling point.  Where there are multiple 
choices, but no opportunity to bargain over them, the bargainers 
will choose the Schelling point.  When corporate governance 
could consist of shareholder wealth maximization or some other 
purpose or purposes, shareholders and managers and directors 
will often, though perhaps not always, alight on the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm because it is the intuitive place to 
settle the bargain. 
2. Multiple Equilibria 
 Corporate law is highly flexible and permits shares of 
capital stock to be designed with a dizzying array of rights and 
benefits.181  In smaller corporations, it is entirely possible for the 
parties to construct a bespoke corporation that fits the needs of 
everyone involved.182  In a large corporation with many investors, 
or with many shares of stock to potentially sell in a liquid mar-
ket, coordinating this customization would be impossible.  This 
does not mean, however, that multiple points of agreement would 
not be wealth-enhancing for the corporation and the shareholders 
alike. 
 
managed firms and bought up well-managed firms. This is also consistent with price 
theory’s tenet that prices work like a communication signal—they contain information. 
180 Cf. Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1037, 1053–55. 
181 Goshen & Squire, supra note 166, at 798–801, 805–10; see also MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 6.21 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 152 (West 
2017). 
182 It is unclear whether smaller corporations actually do this. 
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As discussed above, scholars, not to mention courts, have 
struggled with how to manage divergent shareholder prefer-
ences.183  Not every shareholder may desire the decision purport-
ed to maximize wealth because, for example, that shareholder’s 
individual interests may be harmed separately.184  Or, an inves-
tor may wish to maximize her overall utility from all of her 
investments, as opposed to maximizing her wealth from her 
investments in a number of individual firms.185  But, as Profes-
sors Jensen and Meckling described, the corporate nexus of 
contracts is how the divergent individual preferences achieve 
equilibrium.186  In the sense that Professors Easterbrook and 
Fischel developed, the law has developed processes and doctrines 
for coordinating the moves to or between equilibria. 
Where there are multiple wealth-enhancing equilibria, a new 
transaction cost emerges: which equilibrium to choose.  A corpo-
rate purpose of shareholder wealth maximization is a productive 
equilibrium, but this Article grants that stakeholderists and 
ESG/CSR proponents may have identified other ones and that 
several scholars have raised formidable questions about the 
future of wealth maximization in the traditional sense.187  A 
corporate governance that takes into account, say, the impact of 
corporate decisions on climate change could even be a superior 
equilibrium compared to one that focuses on maximizing 
financial wealth of the shareholders as a class.  The issue is that 
the shareholder wealth maximization equilibrium is relatively 
more visible, objective, and verifiable than these others.  
Similarly, it is more contextually intuitive.  At this point, with a 
mature corporate law and governance, much of its contextual 
intuitiveness could be of the kind that Professor David Friedman 
described: it is the rule now because everyone knows it is and has 
been the rule.188 
To some extent, shareholder wealth maximization is a crea-
ture of corporate law, but there is little reason to believe it does 
not apply in other entities in some form, and in all forms, there is 
some coordinating norm of going into business for the purpose of 
 
183 Lipton, supra note 21, at 865–67, 888. 
184 Id. at 866–67; see also Griffin, supra note 43, at 79–81. 
185 Heminway, supra note 51, at 944. 
186 See supra Part II. 
187 Heminway, supra note 51, at 970 n.89; Lipton, supra note 21, at 888. 
188 Friedman, supra note 13, at 2. 
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earning a profit for those who have gone into the business.189  A 
simple example of a two-shareholder, close corporation, which 
many states treat more like a partnership,190 represents a rela-
tively low-transaction-costs environment where the two parties 
could actually consider the terms of their venture.  However, 
many cases have arisen, and still arise, where the parties 
actually do not bargain over the terms of their relationship.191  
While this could be due to insufficient capital to hire attorneys, 
Professors Jeffrey Manns and Robert Anderson have illustrated 
that even parties with the means to hire attorneys to bargain 
over every term of their agreement simply do not do so.192  In 
theory, if they did, it might be fair to infer that the bargain 
represented the precise desires of both parties and proof of the 
mutual benefit of the transaction.193  In fact, the parties do not 
actually bargain in a literal or meaningful sense, but they still 
reach a deal.194  Critics have taken this as substantial evidence 
that contractual principles cannot map precisely enough onto 
corporate law to be workable.  Thus, a difficult and unsettled 
question arises about the efficiency, optimality, or wealth-
enhancing nature of the choice.195  One way that people have 
dealt with multiple equilibria and the lack of optimality is to 
choose the one that it is the most contextually intuitive—the 
Schelling point.  Perhaps the right explanation for why corporate 
governance remains fixed upon shareholder wealth maximization 
 
189 For example, the common law definition of a general partnership includes the 
elements of two or more people carrying on business together for a profit. UNIF. 
P’SHIP ACT § 101 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2019). Partners owe 
each other fiduciary duties, animated by the concept that all partners act for the 
interest of increasing the wealth of the partnership, of which the partners are 
entitled to equal shares. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE L. 2019).  
190 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 510–
11 (Mass. 1975) (citing Ripin v. U.S. Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1912); 
Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 805 (N.Y. 1965)). 
191 See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510–12, 515–17; Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 
856, 861–63 (Tex. 2014). But see eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 
1, 11, 19–20, 25 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Parties in a close corporation did in fact bargain 
with one another, but they ultimately disagreed and ended up in litigation over 
whether the corporation was going to maximize wealth or be a public service.). 
192 Anderson & Manns, supra note 145, at 61, 84–85 (discussing that sometimes 
changes lawyers make to documents seem to not even reflect conscious choices at 
all). 
193 Cf. Green, supra note 22, at 1413–14, 1418.  
194 Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 578–79. 
195 See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1697, 1704, 1707 (1996); Lipton, supra note 21, at 879, 881. 
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is not because it is necessarily optimal, but because it is intuitive 
and workable.  
B. Contextual Intuitiveness in Corporate Governance 
Among the key insights about Schelling points are that they 
are contextually intuitive.  When attempting a meeting at the 
Empire State Building, the parties objectively understand what 
it is—and, more importantly, where it is—and easily verify it as a 
meeting point.  Within a game where the object is to meet in New 
York City, there are few places that capture the popular imag-
ination like the Empire State Building.196  This makes it a 
contextually intuitive—even poetic197—meeting place when the 
players have no way to discern any information about each other.  
Again, it is critical to emphasize that meeting at the Empire 
State Building is probably not optimal, and in fact, it is likely a 
clear case of a non-optimal equilibrium.  It’s not centrally located 
in New York City, and, depending on where the parties are 
starting, it might not be convenient to either of them.   
Shareholder wealth maximization has a similar objectivity 
and contextual intuitiveness.  As Professor Manne described it, 
the typical shareholder shows up to the corporate bargain after 
the entrepreneurial process has already started and perhaps has 
even largely been completed.198  Shareholders provide investment 
capital—they do not have any reason to desire any control or 
responsibility.  They simply want a return on investment.  Man-
agers and directors, having completed or greatly progressed in 
the entrepreneurship part, are looking for money.  So, they offer 
to the potential shareholders the residual claim, along with the 
only available objective and contextually intuitive implied prom-
ise: to increase the value of that residual claim.   
1. Objectivity and Verifiability of Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization 
Schelling points are objective and verifiable points because 
anyone desiring to coordinate can observe them and thereby con-
firm their observability by others.  So observed, people coordinate 
their activities and confirm coordination by observing others 
 
196 Granted, there is Times Square, Grand Central Station, or perhaps even 
Central Park. 
197 Professor Schelling noted that he expected poets would sometimes be better 
at his coordination games than logicians. See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 58. 
198 See Manne, supra note 78, at 261. 
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locating themselves at the Schelling point—just as one can ob-
serve another person standing in front of the Empire State Build-
ing.  Shareholder wealth maximization shares these features. 
The notion that a business exists to make money, whether or 
not the same is desirable in all cases, is an objective concept.199  
Most people understand what it means to attempt to earn money 
from various business activities and that understanding is 
shared.  Similarly, it is verifiable in that there are simple ways to 
measure whether the amount of money earned is increasing or 
decreasing.  In public stock markets with quoted prices, the cur-
rent capitalized value of a corporation’s future value is, at least 
to some extent, verifiable in that price.200  The price of any given 
fraction of the corporation’s freely-traded residual claim reflects 
that fraction of the corporation’s value to the market as a 
whole.201 
To be sure, there are lots of metrics that might be objective 
and verifiable.  Certainly, a corporation could disclose how much 
carbon it emits from its operating activities in tons, and any 
person—shareholder or otherwise202—who might be interested in 
that information would then be able to observe and verify it.  
This might make it an equilibrium and perhaps even an optimal 
point of corporate coordination.  But there are costs associated 
with this.  Are the metrics right?  Do people truly find them use-
ful?203  Again, the benefits of Schelling points flow from their role 
in creating a choice where there are multiple equilibria and high 
transaction costs.  What separates shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion from other corporate purposes is its contextual intuitiveness.  
While it may be true, and perhaps even obviously so, that it 
would be good if corporations—and non-corporate actors—
reduced their carbon emissions, it is not obvious why or how a 
corporate board of directors and its appointed managers would 
 
199 See Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1382, 1384. 
200 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 18, 20; Manne, supra note 78, 
at 266; Manne, supra note 79. 
201 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 19–20. 
202 Ann M. Lipton, Mixed Company: The Audience for Sustainability Disclosures, 
107 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 81, 81 (2018), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-
journal/glj-online/107-online/mixed-company-the-audience-for-sustainability-disclosures/ 
[https://perma.cc/WQ8B-8PTN]. 
203 See, e.g., Eve Tahmincioglu, SEC Chief Takes on Short-Termism and ESG, 
DIRS. & BDS. (Jul. 22, 2019), https://www.directorsandboards.com/articles/singlesec-
chief-takes-short-termism-and-esg [https://perma.cc/THT5-EMZR]. 
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implement such a normative good as a purpose.204  Corporate 
managers and directors have been implementing shareholder 
wealth maximization as a simple, intuitive corporate purpose for 
over a century.205 
2. The Contextual Intuitiveness of Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization 
Schelling points are contextually intuitive.  People navigat-
ing a context with which they are at least somewhat familiar will 
gravitate toward points that “stand out” within the relevant 
context.  As Professor George Mocsary describes, the Michigan 
Supreme Court in Dodge was merely stating expressly what 
everyone involved with business associations knew and under-
stood intuitively: the purpose of the corporation is to make money 
and the directors and officers should be trying to make money.206  
It was apparently so ingrained in the fabric of the business world 
at the time that the Dodge court spoke of it as though it was 
obvious.207 
It would be simple to imagine that shareholder wealth maxi-
mization reached this contextual intuitiveness because of the 
justifications that emerged from the law-and-economics move-
ment.208  That is, one could imagine early corporations maximizing 
shareholder wealth because it was efficient or because it was a 
majoritarian desire.  But there’s no reason to believe that early 
corporations and their predecessors were efficient or desirable at 
all.209  As with modern large corporations, early large corpora-
tions existed to undertake large, costly, risky and long-term 
projects.  Thus, they needed lots of capital and needed it from a 
larger pool of investors.  They already had boards,210 already paid 
dividends,211 and already collected money from dispersed and 
 
204 Cf. Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1364–65 (distinguishing a corporation’s tacti-
cal and strategic purposes). 
205 Sharfman, supra note 40, at 393–94; see also Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1382. 
206 Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1344. 
207 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
208 See supra Section II.A. 
209 Adam Smith, the “father” of modern free market economics and progenitor of 
the term “invisible hand,” thought corporations were doomed to failure, unless they 
were granted a monopoly or were chartered to handle only “routine” tasks. SMITH, 
supra note 154, at 277; see also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND 
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 7 (1914); BERLE & MEANS, supra note 46, at 4.  
210 SMITH, supra note 154, at 253.  
211 Id. 
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largely disinterested investors.212  Primarily due to the latter 
feature—dispersed and disinterested investors utterly failing to 
exercise any control—they were also thought to be of quite 
limited utility.213   
As described above, economic theories of incentives would 
suggest an intractable problem: managers’ and directors’ incen-
tives are to shirk and potentially steal, and to externalize 
corporate costs onto society, while shareholders’ incentives are to 
remain rationally ignorant of shirking, stealing, or anything else 
managers and directors may be doing.214  If shareholder wealth 
maximization is to persist, then, it must have economic value.  As 
everyone from Professor Coase forward explained: the firm will 
work, or not, based on whether the increased productivity associ-
ated with doing things as a firm exceeds the costs associated with 
doing things as a firm.215  Again, though, no individual share-
holder can guess in advance, nor can any director or manager 
credibly commit in advance that she will be such a good director 
or manager that the firm’s productivity gains will always exceed 
all relevant costs, including agency costs associated with having 
managers and directors.  But since shareholders continue to 
invest, and managers and directors continue to permit public 
stock to be outstanding, there has to be some mechanism holding 
the things together: the Schelling point that is the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm. 
Managers do not have any way to credibly communicate to 
the shareholders their intention to be good central contracting 
agents, and directors struggle to credibly communicate their 
intention, and ability, to be good monitors.  Of course, all man-
agers and directors will promise to efficiently run the corporation 
and not shirk or steal, but that promise is hardly believable in 
the abstract, because they have great incentive to shirk and steal 
and shareholders have neither the power nor incentive to police 
them.216  Managers and directors may even be incentivized to 
oversell their ability to be loyal and competent, because then they 
would have an even better chance of escaping with ill-gotten 
 
212 Id. 
213 Id. Professors Berle and Means echoed this concern separation, once again 
announcing doom for the widely-dispersed-shareholder version of the corporation. 
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 46, at 4–9. 
214 See supra Part II; BERLE & MEANS, supra note 46, at 45–46, 46 n.33. 
215 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 326. 
216 Cf. Manne, supra note 78, at 261. 
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gains.  Yet again, a well-constructed hypothetical bargain grinds 
to a halt because there is no way to credibly communicate, there 
are information asymmetries, and it is really hard for the share-
holders to exercise any true role in governance.217  The surplus 
that might be created by striking the bargain is dependent upon 
all of these costs and benefits equilibrating.218   
As a matter of description of the corporate landscape, the 
existing costs and benefits must have equilibrated somehow.  The 
manner in which they do is measured by adherence to the 
Schelling point: everybody observes the norm that the managers’ 
and directors’ duties are to make their primary ends the increase 
in the value of the corporation, and therefore, the residual claim.  
Managers and directors recognize that this is what they are 
supposed to be doing, while shareholders recognize that this is 
what they should expect the managers and directors to do.  The 
shareholder wealth maximization norm solves the coordination 
and conflict problems219 and creates credibility for managers and 
directors promising shareholders to act in their financial interest.  
3. Putting the Default in Default Rules 
Borrowed from contract law, along with the nexus-of-contracts 
metaphor, contractarian corporate law proposes that corporate 
law is a set of off-the-rack default rules that the parties can 
change if they desire.220  Private ordering is supposed to best 
permit the people with knowledge and information to put it to 
use in the most efficient ways in the market.  The aggregation of 
these private choices, whether they are individually rational or 
not, underpin basic theories of economic efficiency and rational 
utility maximization.221  
If the general idea of default rules is that they facilitate the 
efficiency gains of private ordering, then how should the rules be 
selected?  The simple answer is that default rules should reflect 
what a majority of parties in the relevant space would want if 
they could costlessly bargain.  While the law-and-economics schol-
 
217 Again, the hypothetical nature of the bargain allows the device to ignore 
these costs, but this Article’s goal is to explain the results of the hypothetical 
bargain by illustrating how real bargains can overcome the impediments preventing 
the hypothetical ones.  
218 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 307–08, 311, 336. 
219 Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1039. 
220 Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 578. 
221 See Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. 
ECON. 1, 1–2 (1962).  
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ars have made a formidable case that separation of ownership 
and control, fiat authority, and shareholder wealth maximization 
are majoritarian in nature, Professor Ann M. Lipton, among 
others, has recently argued, quite cogently, that the majority 
may be splintering.222 
If selecting legal default rules by divining majority prefer-
ence is going to be the framework for selecting and reforming 
corporate law rules, Professor Lipton’s analysis perhaps 
foreshadows a shift toward the long-desired—in some quarters—
stakeholderist model, or something else.  If, on the other hand, 
legal default rules are selected by careful observation of the 
coordination points that have been successful in the past, then it 
becomes less clear that a stakeholderist model or some other 
reform is appropriate.  Majoritarian preferences, hypothesized, 
stated, or revealed, are inevitably context-specific.  So, too, are 
Schelling points.  The shareholder wealth maximization Schelling 
point cannot, a priori, reflect that the majority prefers it or that 
it is optimal, but alternative models cannot, a priori, premise 
their proposed superiority without a clear understanding of how 
context-specific coordination around shareholder wealth maximi-
zation contributes to the value of investing in public corporations. 
It does so by providing a point of agreement superior to not 
participating in the bargain by permitting both sides to make a 
credible commitment to one another.  This is true even though 
managers and directors have fiat authority to run the corpora-
tion, even when shareholders remain rationally ignorant of most 
exercises of that authority.  Shareholders will put up with 
managers and directors having practically unreviewable author-
ity, as long as they appear to be using that authority toward the 
ultimate end of shareholder wealth.  If they start expressly 
stating they intend to allocate all potential shareholder wealth to 
other constituencies, they will have, as Professor Bainbridge put 
it, slain the golden goose.223  This illustrates what makes a 
Schelling point a Schelling point: it coordinates bargainers in a 
 
222 Lipton, supra note 21, at 865–66, 868–70. 
223 Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1444. Arguably, this is why the Michigan 
Supreme Court rapped the hand belonging to Henry Ford. That is, he looked at all of 
the surplus Ford Motor Company had produced and decided it would be best 
deployed not just for the long-term interest of Ford Motor Company the business 
institution, but for the good of all mankind. Put in modern terms, that was not what 
the Dodge brothers—or Ford himself—had bargained for.  
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high-transaction-cost environment.  Take away the Schelling point, 
and the bargaining process could very easily spin out of control.224  
4. Stickiness—Once a Schelling Point, Always a Schelling Point 
One of the interesting features of Schelling points is that 
once one is established (by law or agreement or otherwise), it 
tends to be even more “focal” than it was in the beginning.225  As 
Professor David Friedman pointed out, Schelling’s work sug-
gested that parties would take seemingly inefficient actions—
perhaps even to the point of seeming cognitively-biased—merely 
to preserve the past point of agreement.226  
As conceded here, viewing shareholder wealth maximization 
as a Schelling point does not answer the question, “is shareholder 
wealth maximization the optimal rule?”  In fact, this Article 
makes the distinct concession that shareholder wealth maximi-
zation may not be the optimal rule in all cases.  Its potential for 
mischief has been robustly theorized, if not completely empir-
ically shown.  Other interests matter, moral questions abound, 
and aesthetic preferences have value, too.227  A concession this 
Article wishes to elicit from those perhaps considering a nor-
mative shift away is that shareholder wealth maximization has 
an emergent quality and an empirical value that is not always 
captured in the contested arguments supporting its downstream 
economic efficiency or doctrinal sturdiness.  That is, claims about 
inefficient outcomes, exception-laden doctrines, and alternative 
hypothetical bargains228 do not, and perhaps cannot, fully address 
the coordinating power of the norm.  The coordinating power of 
the norm came first, then the law enshrined it, and now 
 
224 John H. Cochrane, Toward a Run-Free Financial System, in ACROSS THE 
GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 197, 206–08, 215 
(Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014) (describing a theory of “information 
sensitivity” in financial assets). 
225 Friedman, supra note 13, at 8; see also Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of 
Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 518–19 (2009) (describing the 
role of judicial opinions in establishing focal points); see generally McAdams, supra 
note 125 (describing and evaluating the role of legal rules and institutions in gener-
ating focal points); see generally Ahdieh, supra note 127 (presenting the argument 
that government regulation may in some cases facilitate better coordination points 
than those which emerge on their own). 
226 Friedman, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
227 Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the 
Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 41–42 (2015); see also R.H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960); Green, supra note 22, 
at 1412–13. 
228 See supra Section II.B. 
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investors’ expectations for it are sticky.  This suggests, at 
minimum, that shareholder wealth maximization is creating 
value, even if it is not creating or capturing all potential value. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Shareholder wealth maximization’s justifications and critiques 
focus on its economic efficiency or lack thereof, its doctrinal 
sturdiness or lack thereof, and its potential ability to create 
social value or impede desired social reforms.  This debate takes 
place downstream—that is, it takes place in a world where share-
holder wealth maximization is at least mostly understood to be 
the governing norm and the animating principle of legal duties of 
managers and directors.  Critics have robustly shown that the 
downstream benefits allegedly attributable to shareholder wealth 
maximization are more elusive than they should be, even if they 
are not illusory.  This Article provides a different view of the 
question.  It argues that the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm is an emergent, privately created coordinating point that 
arose from a high-transaction-cost bargain.  That is, the share-
holder wealth maximization norm is a Schelling point.  Since the 
participants in the corporate bargain need each other to generate 
a surplus from economic activity, but cannot communicate with 
one another in a low-cost way, they need a way to solve this 
coordination problem.  A Schelling point is an intuitive, imperfect 
way to solve a problem, so the bargainers may be expected to find 
each other there.  The Schelling point in this bargain is a com-
mitment from managers and directors to maximize the financial 
value of the firm, and therefore maximize the shareholders’ 
wealth.  Shareholder wealth maximization may not always be 
optimal, but it is reliably useful. 
 
